Almost four months after the US-Israel war on Iran began, Presidents Trump and Pezeshkian have agreed an outline of the basis for negotiations. Their Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed on 17 June after almost four months of war. It was brokered by Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, with the support of Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt. The Islamabad Memorandum extends the ceasefire and opens a 60-day period for a final agreement to be reached.
The 14-point text, which was read to journalists by US officials, promises an ‘immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon’ while negotiations take place. Shipping will start moving through the Strait of Hormuz again and the US naval blockade will begin to be lifted. The nuclear status quo will be maintained. Pending a final deal, Iran’s nuclear programme will not change, and the US will not impose new sanctions.
If the MoU does result in progress, both parties will get some of what they want. But plenty of scepticism about it doing so remains. As BBC Chief International Correspondent and long-time Middle East watcher, Lyse Doucet commented, it’s already being referred to as a Memorandum of Misunderstanding.
The pinch points are clear:
Israel did not take part in negotiations and is not a party to the preliminary agreement. Hours after Trump and Pezeshkian signed it off, as the first oil tankers were sailing through the Strait, Israeli Defence Forces launched fresh airstrikes on Lebanon. Israel has seized control of a large swathe of south Lebanon since the war began at the end of February. More than a million Lebanese – almost 20% of the entire population – have been displaced by Israel’s attacks, and over 3,500 killed.
Agreement over Iran’s nuclear programme is likely to hold the greatest potential to unravel the coming talks – the future of Iran’s enrichment programme and what happens to its uranium stockpile, as well as the lifting of US and international sanctions. Points 8 and 9 of the MoU are abstract or ambiguous or both. For example, the US and Iran ‘have agreed to resolve the disposition of stockpiled enriched material pursuant to a mechanism that will be mutually agreed upon’.
The MoU is silent on this. During the G7 press conference in the Palace of Versailles. Trump said he would be working with Gulf allies to address Iran’s ballistic missile programme, appearing to suggest that Iran could retain its ballistic missiles.
So what if anything has Trump achieved?
Military action has not resulted in the regime change he and Benjamin Netanyahu sought. Iran’s nuclear weapons capability and ballistic missile programme have not been destroyed, and its network of regional allies remains in place though weakened. Trump was blindsided by Iran’s economic and military responses. Closing Hormuz caused an oil market tailspin that he was unable to control.
Iran has emerged from the war stronger. Trump’s personal standing is damaged, as is the United States international reputation.
Oil disruptions together with Iran’s drone and missile attacks on Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and on US military bases set the Gulf states at odds with US policy. As one commentator put it, the war has caused the Gulf states to pivot away from normalising relations with Israel and towards improving regional stability and achieving greater strategic autonomy.
In the US, the Iran war has resulted in increasing the strains within the Republican Party as the mid-term elections approach, while Trump’s declining approval ratings have declined further as price rises and shortages impacted on US voters and agri-businesses.
The degree to which Trump can regroup and recoup, if at all, remains to be seen. What is clear, however, is that the US and Israel’s war on Iran has achieved none of its aims. Trump goes weakened into the next round of talks.