The fragile ceasefire that followed the US and Israel’s military assault on Iran is holding, for now at least, while Benjamin Netanyahu’s attention is focussed on his endgame for Gaza. The western media lens, which shifted away from Iran after the 12-day military campaign in June, recently returned with the announcement that Britain, France, and Germany (E3) are initiating snapback sanctions.
During the 12-day attack, Trump and Netanyahu claimed their aim was preventing Iran’s imminent development of nuclear weapons. President Trump has repeatedly insisted Iran is a few weeks away from having a nuclear bomb. Throughout the 12 days, Rafael Grossi, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) insisted there was no evidence Iran was developing nuclear weapons. He told the UN Security Council: “The IAEA can guarantee, through a watertight inspections system, that nuclear weapons will not be developed in Iran.”
US and Israel’s strategic goals
Though militarily weakened by this and other recent attacks, and despite the economic strain caused by international sanctions, Iran is still a powerful obstacle to Trump’s strategic goal in the region. Trump’s goal being to normalise relations between Israel and its regional neighbours. Iran is also a chief obstacle in the way of Netanyahu’s attempts to quell Palestinian opposition and strengthen Israel’s grip on the Middle East.
Israel is explicitly seeking regime change, quietly supported by the United States. On day one of the June attack, Netanyahu appealed to the people of Iran to rise up against the regime, and he continues to do so.
The breadth of targets in June not only included nuclear research facilities, fuel enrichment plants, and nuclear power plants, but also Iran’s air defences, and other military and civilian facilities. Israel’s Defence Force (IDF) assassinated Iranian nuclear scientists, politicians, and military leaders. Images broadcast by Iranian state media have exposed Israel’s covert operations inside Iran before the attacks – showing the deployment of Israeli agents and extensive use of small drones in the opening hours of the June offensive.
The Israel-Iran ceasefire may be holding, but the shadow war with Iran continues. In a StW-CND webinar during the military bombardment, General Secretary of the TSSA rail union Maryam Eslamdoust, speaking in a personal capacity, explained what this means. The bombardment, she explained, was not only a military campaign but also a psychological one:
“Iran State TV was hacked. Live on-air viewers across the country saw their screens cut to unfamiliar visuals and messages delivered in Farsi, encouraging Iranians to rise up. The same network was bombed while a woman presenter was live on air. It’s a message that we can get inside your buildings, your screens, your minds – an attempt to intimidate and destabilise not just with force but with fear.
“There’s an information war. I’ve seen social media flooded with posts from IDF accounts using the Iranian language and the language of the Iranian protest movements from two years ago, especially the slogan ‘Woman, Life, Freedom’ to call for regime change. That was never meant to justify bombs. Iranian women wanted dignity and justice, not war.”
She ended with a passionate plea: “The Iranian people want peace, they want dignity, and they want the right to shape their own future. Free from bombs, free from fear, and free from foreign coercion.”
Trump’s objectives
Trump’s so-called nuclear talks go deeper than Iran’s potential for a nuclear weapons programme. They seek to further limit the development of a civil nuclear power programme (which all nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty signatories are entitled to pursue), end Iran expanding drone and ballistic missile capabilities, and its support for a network of regional proxies. Within weeks of taking office in January this year, Trump signed National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 (NSPM2) which turned those objectives into a directive to all offices of state.
Trump also announced a campaign of ‘secondary sanctions’ aimed at countries buying oil and gas from Iran, suggesting US businesses will not be allowed to trade with these countries. This campaign is mainly aimed – with little success – at China which accounts for around 90% of Iran’s oil exports. In April Trump also imposed secondary sanctions on countries importing oil from Venezuela, again aimed at China.
Trump’s approach to Iran’s nuclear weapons potential contrasts with that of President Obama, which resulted in the Iran nuclear deal – the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA), widely regarded as a successful arms limitation agreement. It lifted nuclear-related sanctions on Iran in return for a commitment by Iran to restrict its civil nuclear programme and permit rigorous International Atomic Energy Association (IAEL) inspections. Germany and the five permanent members (P5) of the UN Security Council – US, UK, China, Russia, and France – as well as Iran were signatories to the JCPoA.
The agreement was codified in UNSC Resolution 2231 of 2015. However, Trump effectively killed the JCPoA in his first presidential term by withdrawing the US from the JCPoA in 2018 and de-certifying UNSC 2231, claiming Iran was developing nuclear weapons.
Snapback sanctions
Multiple IAEA inspection reports at that time confirmed Iran was adhering to the terms of the agreement. These reports were universally accepted, including by US authorities. In 2020, however, even though the US was no longer party to the JCPoA, Trump invoked a ‘snapback’ mechanism in UNSC 2231, claiming Iran was failing to honour the agreement and calling for the UN to reimpose sanctions.
The UNSC president at that time blocked Trump’s attempt to activate snapback, citing a lack of consensus in the Security Council, after which Trump imposed US sanctions on Iran. A year later the E5 followed suit. Unlike the US, however, they remained parties to the JCPoA and UNSC 2231. Despite objections by other P5 Security Council members, a year later Britain, France, and Germany followed suit and reimposed sanctions.
The above events, in outline, are the basis for continuing claims by Russia and China that sanctions on Iran are illegal – a position they reiterated as recently as March this year. A joint statement by China, Russia, and Iran, called for restraint not escalation – emphasising their support for UNSC 2331 and the need to uphold the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Iran’s right to civil nuclear power as a signatory, and calling for the removal of unlawful sanctions on Iran.
Iran responded to the US and E3 sanctions imposed during Trump’s first term by exceeding the agreed limits on its stockpile of low-enriched uranium and enriching uranium in higher concentrations. It must be noted that these higher levels of uranium enrichment were not high enough for their use in a nuclear bomb, as the IAEA and other experts have pointed out. Nonetheless, increasing uranium enrichment has become the basis of current claims by the US and its allies that Iran is in breach of the JCPoA and on the verge of possessing nuclear weapons.
Under the terms of UNSC 2231, the JCPoA terminates on 18 October this year, at which point all nuclear related sanctions against Iran are due to end. However, on 28 August this year, the E3 notified the UNSC they were initiating snapback sanctions on the grounds of Iran’s ‘significant non-compliance’ with the terms of the JCPoA, These are due to kick in 30 days after notification of snapback, unless the UNSC adopts a resolution against snapback.
In a statement to the IAEA’s Board of Governors on 8 October, Grossi confirmed he had “continuously and systematically” reached out to restore the “indispensable cooperation” with Iran, and that “progress has been made” during ongoing discussions. It remains to be seen if this is likely to influence the imposition of snapback.
Iran’s response
Throughout Trump’s election campaign and his second term in office, Iran has repeatedly called for nuclear negotiations with the US to be resumed and, until the military attack in June, continued to permit IAEA inspections. The latter were the basis on which the IAEA Director General confirmed to the UNSC that there were no credible indications that Iran has a nuclear weapons programme.
After the June attack, Iran halted IAEA inspections and threatened withdrawal from the NPT – a clear hint that a nuclear weapons programme might be pursued. This was widely reported in the western media. Since then, and noticeably less reported in the west, Iran has opened talks with the IAEA and remains a member of the NPT.
Limited military exchanges between Israel and Iran had already taken place in April 2024, and more extensive exchanges in September-October after an Israeli airstrike killed Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and others. Leaked US classified documents suggest CIA involvement. The Fars News Agency, controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) released footage suggesting Israel was targeting Iran’s air defences in preparation for future attacks.
Against this background, talks between Iran and the Trump administration, which began in early March hosted by Qatar on behalf of the Gulf States, have floundered. Netanyahu’s relentless onslaught against Palestinians across the Occupied Territories have so far proved insurmountable in Trump’s attempts to gain Gulf state support for his campaign to lever Iran into an agreement which goes beyond nuclear weapons. On the contrary, there has been limited signs that the actions of Trump and Netanyahu have resulted in a partial thaw in relations between Iran and the Gulf states.
The military attacks of 2024-25 have by and large seen the Iranian opposition retreat from the streets. As with Iraq in 1991 and 2003, and many other examples across the world, the Iranian people have united for now against their foreign invaders.
End the nuclear hypocrisy
The mendacity of Israel, the US, and the E3 is clear from the events described above, and by and large, the abject failure of western media to report the full story surrounding Iran nuclear negotiations. It should come as no surprise that the events of 2024-25 have strengthened the voice of Iranian hawks calling for withdrawal from the NPT and the development of a nuclear weapons programme.
Most breathtaking of all perhaps, is the hypocrisy of the United States and Europe in failing to acknowledge that Isreal has possessed nuclear weapons since the 1960s. Israel has never acknowledged it has nuclear weapons, and has never signed the NPT.
Isreal’s nuclear weapons were disclosed by Mordecai Vanunu, an heroic Israeli whistle-blower at the Dimona nuclear plant. Vanunu spent 18 years in Israeli jails, mostly in solitary confinement, for his disclosure. He was released in 2004, but his movements are still severely restricted.
Israel’s nuclear weapons are unacknowledged by the US and its allies, and rarely mentioned by a compliant western media.
The double standards applied to the treatment of Iran by Israel, the US, Britain, and Europe compared to the disregard of Israel’s nuclear armoury should be challenged as fiercely and as frequently by the anti-war movements across Europe and North America, as Netanyahu’s actions against Gaza have been.
Removing Israel’s nuclear weapons is every bit as important as preventing Iran from acquiring them, and indispensable to the long-term stability of the Middle East.