Philippe Sands QC, professor of law at University College London, says Blair's legacy is an unlawful and disastrous conflict that continues to cause misery and claim lives, shredding public trust in government.
By Phillipe Sands
Guardian
21/22 January 2011
Tony Blair sneaks in under cover of darkness to avoid anti-war protesters
BEFORE: The questions Tony Blair should face at the Chilcot inquiry
Since Tony Blair appeared before the Chilcot inquiry in January 2010 new witness testimony, documentary evidence and information has emerged that suggests the evidence he gave was incomplete or inaccurate. This material – together with other material that has not yet been declassified but which I have seen – indicates that Blair ignored legal advice and gave an early commitment to President Bush that was not disclosed to the cabinet or to parliament. Of particular significance is the evidence from, and relating to, the attorney general, including his statement of 4 January 2011, published earlier this week. The Chilcot inquiry has everything it needs to establish that Blair willingly and knowingly misled the cabinet, parliament and the British public. These are the kinds of questions it should be asking, with probing follow-up questions that direct Blair to specific documents that point out the inconsistencies and gaps in his accounts:
1) This month Lord Goldsmith told the inquiry that in October 2002 he "learned that the prime minister had indicated to President Bush that he would join the US in acting without a second security council decision if Iraq failed to take the action that was required by the draft resolution [1441]". Is his account accurate? Assuming it to be accurate, can you explain why you failed to disclose this undertaking to the cabinet or to parliament in 2002, or to this inquiry during your last appearance?
2) Lord Goldsmith has also now told the inquiry that the statement you made to parliament on 15 January 2003 (that in certain circumstances a further security council resolution would not be necessary) was incompatible with the legal advice he had given you. Why did you ignore his advice?
3) In his memoir (Decision Points), President Bush gives the following account of your meeting with him on 31 January 2003 in the White House: "Tony wanted to go back to the UN for a second resolution … 'It's not that we need it,' Tony said. 'A second resolution gives us military and political protection.'" Can you confirm this to be an accurate account of what you said to him? Assuming that to be the case, can we proceed on the basis that you would not object to the declassification of extracts from (1) your letters to President Bush, and (2) accounts of your meetings with him that confirm his account?
4) On 30 January 2003 Lord Goldsmith wrote to you that "resolution 1441 does not authorise the use of military force without a further determination by the security council … that Iraq's conduct indicates that it has failed to take the final opportunity grated by the council". President Bush's memoirs indicate that you did not give effect to that advice; on what basis did you feel able to ignore the advice of the attorney general? Given the consistency and clarity of the advice given to you by the attorney general over the preceding eight months, did you have any reason for believing that his advice was liable to change so dramatically?
5) Why did you not share with the cabinet any information about the commitment you had given to President Bush at the White House on 31 January 2003? Would you accept that your account to parliament about that meeting with President Bush was incomplete and inaccurate?
AFTER: Chilcot inquiry - the bare facts on Iraq are there for all to see, Mr Blair
The questions sent by the Chilcot Inquiry to Tony Blair make crystal clear the key issues on which the report will focus.
In the run up to the war these include: the timing, nature and extent of commitments given to President Bush; the preparation and presentation of intelligence; the circumstances of the decision to return to the United Nations; the role of the attorney general and the effect of his legal advice at various stages; the role of the cabinet; and the presentation of information to parliament and the public.
Mr Blair's responses to those questions are, to put it charitably, elusive and less than complete. But once the fluff is stripped away, today's defensive testimony, the written answers and the totality of the evidence before the tribunal points to a simple story: the prime minister took an early decision to support President Bush in the quest to remove Saddam, assured him repeatedly of his unequivocal statement of support, ignored the law, and deprived the cabinet and parliament of key information.
In short, Mr Blair managed to skilfully lead the entire machinery of government — attorney general, cabinet, parliament — into a place from which British involvement in the war became inevitable.
Mr Blair has paid a big price for delivering his commitment to President Bush: his legacy is an unlawful and disastrous conflict that continues to cause misery and claim lives, shredding public trust in government, diminishing Britain's role in the world, and undermining the rule of law. To the Chilcot inquiry falls the task of picking up the pieces.
Philippe Sands QC is professor of law, University College London, and a barrister at Matrix Chambers
