The theme running throughout Greg Muttit's book is that Iraq's grim fate has been bound up with the lake of oil that lies beneath.
Stop the War Coalition
4 May 2011
Well before the Western powers invaded Iraq back in March 2003, it was widely acknowledged that this was a conquest for oil. Greg Muttit, activist and journalist, shared that view and marched in protest with over a million others on 15th February 2003. In his book, 'Fuel on the Fire – Oil and Politics in Occupied Iraq', he has produced a sprawling and meticulously researched compendium of evidence revealing the designs of politicians and corporations to pillage Iraq of its resources.
Muttit traces the history of Iraq chronologically from the birth of the country, through its coups and revolutions, up until the present occupation to which he devotes most of the book. The one theme throughout is that Iraq's grim fate has been bound up with the lake of oil that lies beneath.
So Muttit begins by taking us back to the days following WWI when the West began to realise the future importance of oil. Following WWI, Britain installed Faisal, granted Iraq nominal sovereignty whilst continuing to occupy and control it to one degree or another. Throughout that time, the West controlled Iraqi oil through a consortium of Western oil companies (Muttit muses: a familiar sequence of events?). Then in 1972, the Baath Party who had recently come to power, nationalised Iraq's oil. This has been the country's doom ever since.
Then to the present day, Muttit's research reveals vast amounts of evidence demonstrating Britain's explicit plans to control Iraq's oil since 2003. For example, through an application under the Freedom of Information Act, Muttit has obtained a hitherto unknown document minuting a Department of Trade and Industry meeting prior to the war in which proposals for Iraq's oil were discussed. They envisioned 'Iraq as a member of OPEC but on the dovish side - favouring greater output at more sustainable prices' with 'an oil sector open and attractive to foreign investment' via long-term production sharing agreements and, as requested by the British oil companies, with 'a level playing field in which all interested parties can bid for development contracts on an open and equal basis'. These policies are in stark contrast to Blair's public claims at the time that the war had nothing to do with oil and that decisions would be made for the benefit of the Iraqi people.
Muttit's writing is easy to digest, conversational and engaging, occasionally slipping into the first person to narrate his own personal experiences in Iraq since the invasion including extracts from his various interviews with Iraqi politicians. At times he will stop to reflect on the unfolding events. Even the most experienced reader will gain new insights from 'Fuel on the Fire'. One intriguing insight is Muttit's account of why oil inspires countries to invade. The primary reason for these wars is not that the invading government wants to keep either the oil or the profits for itself and its corporate associates (as most people believe) – although that is a secondary objective. In fact, the primary reason is to ensure a high global supply of oil and therefore a corollary low price. The reason for this, Muttit explains is that high oil prices damage the economy of importing countries such as America and Britain. Ten out of the eleven recessions since WWII, including the 2008 recession, were preceded by periods of high oil prices. These recessions can cost governments an election. So it is that although America would prefer to win the oil contracts for itself, it would settle for Russia, China or France, for example, controlling a particular country's oil, so long as it kept production high.
Perhaps the most interesting part of the book is the sense of hope that Muttit sees in an otherwise devastating occupation. He says 'Both recent and more remote history suggest that Iraqis will not quietly allow themselves to be trampled underfoot; nor will they willingly see the Iraqi state reduced to a mere global gas pump.' For example, Muttit reveals how Paul Bremer had sought to balkanize Iraqis into different sects: Shia, Sunni and Kurdish, in an effort to divide and rule, by insisting on ethnic/religious quotas in the Iraqi Governing Council Iraq, notwithstanding the Iraqi people being generally a nationalistic rather than a sectarian people. Nevertheless, Iraqi civil society has developed since 2003 despite the odds and indeed in 2008, Iraqi leaders began to turn away from sectarianism and move towards nationalism.
Furthermore, Muttit highlights the 'impressive and quite surprising achievement' of the defeat of the passage of the Western oil law in 2008 by grass roots movement led by Iraqi trade unions, oil experts, political and religious groups. As a result of their campaigning work, the oil contracts that have now been signed, although still problematic, give away far less to investors. Muttit is not the only commentator who recognizes the success of the Iraqi resistance and failure of Western objectives in Iraq. Other leading academics like Jonathan Steel, Noam Chomsky, David Gardner and others share his view.
There are those who still claim the war was not about oil. How could America and Britain reduce a country to rubble and ash over resources? 'Fuel on the Fire' is now one of the most comprehensive bodies of evidence refuting that claim. Muttit's findings are, of course, grim and heart breaking. But to learn of the strength of the Iraqi spirit in the face of such brutality is also inspiring. The book is ultimately optimistic and should encourage the anti-war movement to continue its support for the Iraqi people's resistance to the occupation.
